Tuesday, 19 October 2010

Union Carbide Worker Testimony

M. L. Verma. Age 37

(Carbide Worker Token No 4557)

Industry Inspector, Government of Madhya Pradesh

(Original1y hired for alpha-naphthol plant)

I joined Union Carbide on 28 March 1977 as part of the second batch for the alpha-napthol plant. I had six months of classroom training and no training on the job. During the on-the-job training period they used us for precommissioning and start up of the napthol plant. I continued working in the napthol plant but the plant was not running successfully. There were plans for large-scale modifications, for which they shut down the plant. In this period most of the operators of the napthol plant were transferred to the formulation plant. As there was no qualified operator jobs, we worked as packers and in other labor class jobs. We came back to the napthol plant when it restarted, but it still did not function properly. They decided to permanently close down the alpha-napthol plant, so all the operating staff became jobless. They launched a voluntary retirement scheme and about 30 workers resigned. Those of us who remained were sent for theoretical training for the MIC plant. After training, we took exams for selection as an MIC unit Operator. I was selected.

About September 1983. I was sent to the MIC unit for on-the-job training. There they told me that I must learn about the MIC plant from my fellow workers. When the plant was running, it was difficult to take on-the-job training, but somehow I began learning about the MIC process. My demands for assistance were always refused. In this period I was asked to take charge when regular operator was absent from duty. I refused to take charge under these conditions; they had not confirmed me as a regular operator for the MIC plant. I had decided not to take charge until I after confirmation because 1 wanted to be sufficiently trained and I wanted the financial benefits. For these reasons, management refused to confirm me. They said there were no vacancies.

They gave me an oral warning about the job refusal but never gave it in writing since they were aware that I was not confirmed as a regular operator. However there were workers given confirmations who joined UCIL after me and who were less qualified. These persons never resisted management using them in positions for which they were not qualified. For almost a year I refused to take charge as an operator because 1 was not yet confirmed. Then, in November 1984, MIC plant manager S. P. Choudhry told me that if I did not follow all orders, I would be transferred to other units. I told him that I was not refusing any job for which I was confirmed. I would perform any job for which I was needed if I was trained properly and was receiving proper financial benefits. I told Choudhry that if they were to transfer me due to false charges of job refusal, I wanted it in writing so that I could proceed with a legal response.

After a few days, S. P. Choudhry took an oral test from me about the MIC plant process and said that if I passed the test I would be confirmed. I took the test and was able to give a correct reply to every question. Nonetheless, I was given a failure on the test and told I was not fit for the MIC plant. Then they told me that I would be transferred to the Sevin plant. They mentioned the transfer in their daily notes but did not give me any letter. I argued that a daily note is not sufficient for transfer purposes, or that I required a letter. Nor did they mention the transfer on the notice board.

Even though on the basis of the oral test they said that I was not capable as an MIC plant operator, they had tried months before to force me to take charge in the MIC plant unit when I was not confirmed. The transfer was S. P. Choudhry's way of taking revenge for my not obeying him in the past. Although they announced my transfer on 26 November, I continued to come to the MIC unit. I also began to personally report to the M1C plant superintendent and to the production assistant. This continued until the night of the gas leak. During the week, no action was taken against me for not reporting to the Sevin plant. I went to the MIC unit and sat there because there was no work for me.

On 2 December 1984 I was on night shift. I punched my card around 10:50 and reported to the production assistant of the MIC plant. About 11:15 P.M., I was sitting in the MIC control room along with my fellow workers. Then I went to the tea room at the 200-ton refrigeration unit. Generally, when we are free MlC operators sit in this room. The window of the tea room toward the MIC unit was open. Around 11:30, we felt MIC irritation so we came out from the room to locate the source of the leak. We saw that some water was dropping from the MIC plant structure.

Near that water the MIC was in greater concentration. As we came toward the vent gas scrubber side we felt high MIC concentration. We reported the MIC leak to production assistant S. Qurashi. The plant superintendent was also sitting there in the control room. They replied that the MIC plant is down and thus there is no chance of leak. They did not take our report seriously, saying “Koi baht nahin appan chay ke bad dhekhenge” (“Okay, no problem, we’ll see after tea").

In the meantime, the tea boy came to the control room and we took tea. Then the plant superintendent went to smoke a cigarette near the security gate, as it is not allowed on the plant premises. Now the time was around 12:30. With the supervisor, we went to the MIC plant. The operator, Khampariya, was ordered to spray water on the leaking point. The supervisor was not able to trace out the source of the leak. Around 12:50 the leak became vigorous and started corning out from, the vent gas scrubber atmospheric line. I was standing in front of the control room when the siren started. After a few minutes, the plant superintendent came back to the MIC unit. As he met me, he asked, "What happened?" I told him MIC was pouring from the top of the vent gas scrubber.

Because of the siren, the emergency squad came to the MIC unit. They tried to control the leak by massive water spraying. I also helped them until the conditions in the area became unbearable. Then along with other workers I left the MIC unit area in the opposite wind direction. The MIC production assistant also fled. When the plant superintendent came back from smoking, he ordered that the loud siren be stopped. This was around 1:00 A.M. Around 2:00 A.M. when we learned that the toxic release was affecting the communities outside the plant, we argued with the p1ant superintendent to restart the loud siren. He refused saying it would serve no purpose, but we insisted until he switched it on again, Around 2:15, the gas leak stopped so we returned to the MIC unit and discovered that the MIC production assistant was missing. After some time, we learned that he was lying near the boundary wall. Some workers brought him to the dispensary.

Around 3:00 A.M. I saw many people from outside coming for medica1 he1p. Many were in dying condition. A managerial staff member, Roy Choudhry, and others were denying help to these people from outside. We argued with the dispensary staff, telling them that we must provide any help possible since they were affected by a leak from our factory. Finally they began to administer basic first aid. When I came to know that the area in which my family was living was also affected, 1 rushed home. This was around 5:00 A.M. Outside the plant, I saw how badly the gas had affected people.

I first came to know that UCC was claiming the leak had been caused by sabotage through the newspaper. First they blamed a Sikh terrorist, then a “disgruntled worker.” They never mentioned any name of a worker, but gave a detailed description of one who was disgruntled due to being transferred to the Sevin plant but who remained “illegally" in the MIC unit. Immediately, I knew that they were trying to frame me, even though the description did not fully fit. I think this description came after UCC management people and lawyers interviewed ex-workers. I also gave an interview about my experiences that night. They asked me about my past history with Union Carbide so I told them about my problems regarding confirmation. Then they used this information against me to construct their sabotage theory.

Beyond UCC lies suggesting that I am to blame, there are other reasons why the sabotage theory is clearly incorrect: it is not possible for any worker to put water directly into the MIC tank, as it is a very dangerous job. Further, everyone knows that a MIC and water reaction is very dangerous, not just spoiling the contents of the tank. So, it may be sabotage that caused the leak but not by any worker. If the leak was caused by sabotage, the cu1prit is the management who was responsible for overseeing the safety of the MIC plant. The leak was a result of continuous negligence, unsafe handling and a poor warning system.

Monday, 4 October 2010

Noxious gases

Satinath Sarangi meets Union Carbide executives.

Bob Berzok is your regular corporate executive. He wears a three piece suit and carries lines on his face that appear to come from libido worries. The first and only time I saw him, the Director of Public Relations for Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) was through the plexi-glass screen at the Texas state prison in Houston. It was the middle of the night and from my freezing cell, I was brought into the visiting room. His company had probably realised that keeping us (two gas victims and myself) in jail on charges of criminal trespass would make bad press and sully its public image further. Bob was scared of bad PR. It wasn't even clear that we had been properly arrested; on the previous morning, officers at the annual shareholders' meeting arrested us for the simple act of distributing a fact sheet on Bhopal.
"We are concerned about your suffering", said Bob, "I have the bail money with me and a limousine waiting for you outside." "If your company is really concerned about human suffering," I said into the phone that connected us through the plexi-glass screen, looking into his eyes, "you would release all the medical information you have on the gases that leaked and are killing people in Bhopal to this day." I was watching for a change in his expression as he listened to my alien accent. Nothing happened. He repeated in words and tone exactly what he had just said. Where you and I have eyes, he had frozen cubes. He politely wished me a good night, and left.
Two years later in 1991, with my friend T.R. Chouhan - a former plant operator in Bhopal Union Carbide - I met with Joseph Geoghen in New York city. Again a regular senior executive, and a Vice-President at Union Carbide, USA. He had a lawyer sitting on either side of him and a secretary taking notes. To Joe I repeated the same request I had made to Bob.
Your company is the inventor of industrial production of methyl isocyanate (MIC), one of the gases that leaked in Bhopal. You have been doing research on MIC and other chemicals and their effect on life systems for at least 30 years at your labs in Research Triangle Park, Raleigh. There is mention of at least 16 research studies that you have chosen not to publish, at least one of which is on 'human volunteers'. It does not cost you to give us the information you have generated over the years and for all one knows, this information may be vital in finding the painfully elusive 'proper line of treatment' for those exposed.
While the lawyers whispered behind Joe, and he waited for their conclusion, Chouhan described for thier benefit, the regularity with which samples of workers' blood, urine and other substances had been taken at the factory. These reports were never released. The lawyers had finished their discussion by then and one of them, the Indian guy, whispered into Joe's left ear. We got our answer: he advised us to contact the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for MSDS data sheets and to take out grievances to the Indian Government.
In as few words as possible, (because I could see he was getting impatient) I described the pain of a family from my neighbourhood in Bhopal, who had not known one day's respite from exposure-related illnesses and despite their extreme poverty had left no doctor or hospital unvisited. One of the lawyers indicated he had to catch a flight. I looked at Joe, Joe was looking at his watch. I knew I had little time. I appealed to him not to invoke the Trade Secrets Act and attempt to justify their continued and deliberate withholding of medical information. As politely as I could I reminded him that their denial of information was compounding the injuries they had caused - not only were they impeding development of specific therapies but they were also the direct cause of doctors prescribing drugs that were doing serious damage to peoples' bodies.
When I think of the disaster and try to fathom the minds that decided that it was right and proper to produce one of the most toxic chemicals in the midst of populated settlements; to under-design the factory that would produce that chemical, and then, to direct a global 'economy drive' that, among other things, resulted in the shutting down of the refridgeration plant (to save Rs.700 per day) I draw a blank. In my generous moments I can see them just doing a job to send their children to the right school, have their wives look good at parties and keep up on the golf course. They didn't really know that a mega disaster would result from routine decisions taken as part of normal corporate practice, that of making a bigger profit than last year.
But when I think of the medical disaster that followed and is likely to continue for as long as you and I are alive, I have no generous way of thinking of the regular guys who are the principal authors of this tragedy. From the little that I know there was only one published paper on the health effects of MIC before the disaster. The only available information was held by Union Carbide. They knew - and possibly know more now - about what MIC does in the acute and the chronic phase. They know what it does to the lungs, to the eyes, to the brain, to the reproductive cycle and other systems. They know that by withholding information, they are prolonging the suffering they began, compounding the injuries they originally caused.
What people like Bob and Joe did was mislead people and doctors to think that MIC is nothing but a potent tear gas, scuttle the use of the only antidote known (sodium thiosulphate), send spin doctors and Pentagon toxicologists as specialists to help the Bhopal people, financially ruin the Red Cross Hospitals that were running in Bhopal, and much more.
Bob I hear has retired. What has become of Joe I don't know. Bob's position has been renamed Corporate Communications Manager and is held by Tom Sprick. Mahesh Mathai, maker of the movie, Bhopal Express invited Tom to the New York premiere in April this year. Tom declined on behalf of Union Carbide but assured Mahesh that "the tragedy continues to be a source of anguish for the company." Tom is just another guy with a normal career, he probably even sleeps well each night.
Satinath Sarangi
March 2001
Editor's Note: Opinions included here are that of the author. Robert Berzok accepts that he disagrees with the author on many of the points relating to the Bhopal tragedy, but denies meeting Satinath Sarangi on the night in question above.